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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
EMINENT DOMAIN-PRIVATE PROPERTY DESTROYED PURSUANT TO
SCORCHED EARTH POLICY-HELD COMPENSABLE
Five days following Pearl Harbor, the United States Army seized the Plaintiff's oil supply in Manila. Some of this oil was used for military purposes. On
December 27, 1941, the Army notified the Plaintiffs that the remaining stock and
facilities were being requisitioned for destruction to prevent seizure by oncoming
Japanese forces. On December 31, a few hours before the Japanese took Manila,
the installations were destroyed. The Government has conceded liability for the
oil consumed.- Plaintiffs sue to recover for that portion of the oil supply and those
facilities which were destroyed. Held (3-2): There was a taking within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and the Government must compensate Plaintiffs for the property destroyed. Caltex (Phillipines) Inc. v. United States, 100
Fed. Supp. 970 (Court of Claims-Nov. 6, 1951).
The determination of the Caltex case was based on the authority of Grant v.
United States, I Ct. CL 41, 2 Ct. CL 551 (1863) and Wiggins v. United States, 3
Ct. CL 412 (1867). In the Grant case, the Plaintiff had been furnishing commissary
supplies to the Union Army. When Confederate Forces were about to occupy
the territory, property belonging to the Plaintiff was destroyed under a military
order. The theory relied upon by the Government was that destruction occurred
under conditions of "overruling necessity," and consequently a "taking" was not
incurred. However, the Court held that the "law of overruling necessity" was
applicable only to private actions (drawing an analogy to self defense) and not
relevant to Governmental acts. State decisions dealing with privately conducted
destruction to prevent disaster were thereby distinguished; for example, destruction of certain buildings to check the spread of fire. See, Hale v. Lawrence, 3
Zabriskie (N. J.) 590 (1851); but cf. Russell v. The Mayor, 2 Denio 461 (N. Y.
Cr. of Errors 1845).
The Court in the Grant case then extended its analysis to situations in which
damages were incurred during war time. It distinguished between damages
caused by the State and those caused by the enemy. The former, whether taken for
utilization or destruction, it held compensable; the latter noncompensable. The
Court viewed property confiscated for war purposes as subject to a "taking," for
which compensation must be given to the same extent as property taken for any
other public benefit. "When property is to be put to the good of the nation, the
public generally should bear the cost" (p. 44). The test as promulgated by the
Court in the Grant case was without regard to conditions under which the taking
occurred.

RECENT DECISIONS
The dissenting judges in the instant case refused to follow the broad distinction set forth in Grant v. United States, supra. They proposed that governmental
destruction in the face of an impending military encounter was noncompensable.
Their position is well summarized in the words of Jones, C. J.:
"This Court has been zealous in upholding the force of the eminent
domain provision of the Fifth Amendment. We have not been unmindful of the principle that the Amendment is not suspended in time of war,
and I do not propose that we should be. However, a scrupulous regard
for the" Amendment does not require us to say that property destroyed
by military action was 'taken for public use.' I think that the loss for
which compensation is sought here, considered in its context of time and
place, must be regarded in law what it was in fact-a loss incident to
battle, a loss-'inflicted by our own or enemy forces in the conduct of a
campaign."' (p. 982).
The issue, to those dissenting, was whether the remaining oil and the permanent facilities were taken for public use or whether they were destroyed as an inevitable result of existing battle conditions. Reliance was placed on United States v.
Pacific Railroad, 120 U. S. 227, 7 Sup Ct. 490 (1886), which involved the
destruction by Union Troops of certain bridges located on Claimant's land, in
order to prevent the advance of the Confederate Army. There, the Supreme Court
in discussing the right to compensation for the military destruction of Claimants
property declared:
"Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy,
as the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple
and defeat him, were lawfully ordered. The safety of the State in such
cases overrides all considerations of private loss." (p. 234).
The Supreme Court in the Pacific Railroad case did not rely on the holding
of the Grant case. Instead, the Court chose to base its decision on the authority
of two cases heard before Congress at a"time when there was no Court of.Claims,
and recovery was by Act of Congress. The firt case, Am. State Papers,Class XIV,
Claims p. 199, involved destruction by United States Forces of an American Claimants property which had been seized by the enemy. Congress in disallowing the
claim characterized the loss as a "suffering from the general ravages of war." Had
the test of the Grant case been applied, there would have been recovery, since the
damage was not inflicted by the enemy. The second case decided by Congress
involved substantially the same facts as the first. Recovery was denied on the
grounds that the loss was sustained in "necessary operations of war." Am. State
Papers, Class XIV, Claims p. 835; Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Part I, p. 311 (1822).
Summarizing the wisdom of these Congressional cases, the Supreme Court in
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United States v.Pacific Railroad,supra, said: "The Government cannot be charged
for injuries to, or destruction of, private property caused by military operations of
armies in the field, or measures taken for their safety and efficiency-." (Italics
supplied) (p. 239).
The language of the Congressional cases and that of the Supreme Court in
the Pacific Railroad case shows the test there employed to be substantially at
odds with the test set out in the Grant case and adhered to by the Majority in the
instant case. The precedent-value of either line of reasoning is relatively weak,
since military destruction of American citizens' property is a novel fact situation
in our law, and cases concerned with this issue have been rarely litigated.
The facts of the principle case show that the approach of Japanese forces
necessitated a military decision. The choice was to stay and fight or retreat. Had
the decision been to fight, and during the battle had the property in question been
destroyed, no compensation would be required. Retreat was the wiser alternative,
and as a part of this maneuver the oil was destroyed. The Fifth Amendmen should
not be applied without regard for the realities of the situation under which the
alleged taking occurred. The circumstances here involved reveal that Plaintiffs
property was not taken for any public benefit but was destroyed as a result of a
hostile engagement between our forces and those of the enemy.
Neil R. Farmelo
ADMIRALTY-CONTRIBUTION

DENIED IN NON-COLLISION CASE

Libellant, a shipfitter's employee was injured through the joint negligence of
his employer and the owner of the ship on which he was working. Libellant sued
the shipowners who sought contribution from the shipfitting company. The trial
judge refused to follow a jury finding of comparative negligence but held the
shipfitting company liable for contribution to the ektent of one half of libellant's
total injuries. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn, 89 F. Supp. 765 (E. D. Penn. 1950). The
Court of Appeals upheld the right to contribution but modified the amount libellant could recover to a sum that he would have received if he had elected to sue
under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act, 44 Stat. 1424 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 901, Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F. 2d 403 3rd Cir. 1951).
The Supreme Court through Justice Black (7-2) denied the right to contribution, finding that congressional action would be the appropriate way to create
that remedy, in view of the great amount of admiralty legislation. Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn, 72 S.Ct. 277 (1951).
The common law rule is that joint tortfeasors are not entitled to contribu-

